Distributional Implications of Imperfect Capital Markets by Joon Koo Lee
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS
OF IMPERFECT CAPITAL MARKETS
Joon Koo Lee
Working Paper No. 663




This paper is based on parts of my Ph.D. dissertation. I wish to
express my deep gratitude to Alan Blinder for his encouragement and
valuable advice. I am also grateful to Harvey Rosen, Roger Gordon
and Thad Mirer for their helpful suggestions. Financial support
for this research was provided with a grant from the Sloan
Foundation to the Princeton University Economics Department.
The research reported here is part of the NBER's research program
in Labor Studies. Any opinions expressed are those of the author
and not those of the National Bureau of Economic Research.NBER WorkingPaper #663
April 1981
Distributional Implications of Imperfect Capital Markets
ABSTRACT
The primary aim of this study is to analyze the impact of imperfections
in capital markets on individuals' lifetime allocation plans and the re-
sulting implications for income distribution. The model builds upon Samuel—
son's overlapping generation model with human capital and bequest motives
playing central roles. The model developed here introduces a limit on
the individual's ability to borrow. One of the most important consequences
of this constraint is that human investment falls short of the level where
its marginal return is equal to that of non—human investment. The com-
parative static results show that an individual who has been subject to
the borrowing constraint would increase human investment unambiguously
if he were allowed to borrow freely against future earnings. Discussions
of the distributive implications of this result suggest that the, elimination
ofthe borrowing constraint hasa potential of enhancing both intragenerational
incomeequality and intergenerational mobility. The simulation results
show that the elimination of the borrowing limit would bring about a sig-
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Although a satisfactory theory of the distribution of income is yet to
come, significantprogress has been made towardthat goal by a seriesofattempts
toestablish general theories of income distribution by cbmbinirig existing
piecemeal theories into single synthetic models. One such example is Blinder's
(1974) work which incorporates various elements of piecemeal theories. One of
his main conclusions -isthat inequality in income should not
be ascribed to any single factor, but should be conceived as resulting from the
optimizing behavior of individuals which can be affected by a number of factors.
Thereis one potential cause of inequality,however, which evaded his attention
totally:imperfect capital markets. Different income classes would be affected
differentiallyby the imperfection in capital markets. Therefore, we might
suspect that the present income distribution is influenced by the conditions of
capital markets.
In a world of imperfect capital markets, the timing of the receipt of inter-
generational wealth transfers plays an important role in one's lifetime allocation
processes. As long as the capital markets are perfect, the assumption that
bequest-at-death is the only channel of intergenerational wealth transfers, adopted
in almost every study in the field as well as in Blinder's, does riotpose any
serious analytic problem even though a large portion of such transfers isactually
made in theform of inter vivos transfers. Ishikawa (1974) points out that,though
in a world of perfect capital markets people are indifferent to the tlrnng of
wealth transfers, such neutrality no longer holds if there is some imperfection
in captal markets. There ae several studies confirming that poeplepass large
sums of money to their descendants while the donors are still alive.In this
study, therefore, both capital market imperfections and alternative channels of
intergenerational wealth transfers are explicitly introduced.
The task of investigating thedistributive implications of imperfect capital
marketswill be carried out using both theoretical models and simulation techniques.
The use of numerichl simulation in the study of the size distribution of income3.
or wealth is
rather a recentphenomenon. Inhispioneering work, Pryor(1973)
•demonstrated thatnumerical simulationrethods can be usefullyemployed in
• analyzing distributional
impact of varioussocial institutions.The potential of
such methods was moreconvincingly
demonstrated by aseries of Blinder's works
(l97t, 1976).
Hisdecomposition ofinequality inincomethroughnumerical
simulationadded a newdimensionto ourknowledgeon this subject.We should
also mention importantcontributions alongthis line by Orcuttat al. (1976)
whose microanalytic
simulation model proved-to be a significantnew tool for
policy explorationin general aswell as the analysisof incomedistribution.
However, all these workswere done underan explicit orimplicit assurnptlor!
ofperfect capita].markets, despite
the fact thatthe existence ofcapital market
-imperfection might










Section I introducesthe basictheoretical model.
It is shown how our
representative
individual allocates
resources overhis or her lifeto maximize
lifetime utilitywith given initial
conditions. The mainfocus ison the
individual's response
to an easingof the borrowing
constraint which hehas been
subject to. Itis found that anincrease in borrowing





presents the setupof thesimulationmodel. SectionIII reports thesimulation
results concerning
the distributional
impact of imperfectcapital markets.The
fr
resultsunder variousalternative assumptions
will be comparedwiththe results




Thepresent modelis a version ofthe Samuelson(1958) overlappinggeneration
model with humancapitOl and bequestmotives playingcentral roles. AnindividualL.
decisionmaker, assumed to live two periods of equal length, chooses at economic
age zeroan optimal plan of consumption, human investment, leisure and bequest to
maximize hi (r lier) lifetime utility. He is nOt "economically born" until
after he is ready to choose and implement optimal plans of his own.Hebears
a child "asexually" during the first period, who begins his own economic life at
the beginning of the next period. This rather simplisticassumption about the
reproductionprocess is adopted here to avoid the complications arising from
different regimes of mating behavior, quantity vs. quality of children, population
growth, and soon.
He consumes and works throughout his economic life, i.e., in both periods.
The basic asymmetry between the two periods is that he divides his time between
work and human investment in the firs-t period, while, in the second period, he
chooses between work and leisure, instead of human investment. Bequest motives
are also explicitly introduced in the model. Rather than stipulating that the
onlychannel of intergenerational wealth transfer is through bequests-at-death,
I assume that a substantial amountofnon-human wealth is potentially transferable
to the next generationwhile the agent is still a1ive.
Tofocuson agents' microeconomic optimization behavior, I assume away such
macroeconomic concerns as growth, changed in the price level, unemployment and so
on.I alsoassume at first that people have perfect foresight about events inthe
future; this assumption will be relaxed later on. It is also assumed that
individual neither derives utility from the mere possession of human or non-human
wealth, nor derives disutility from being in debt.
At economic age zero, a representative individual chooses an optimal lifetime
plan with exogenously given wage rate (w1), non—human wealth (A0).,. and an
inheritance(I) which he has notyet received but which heknows will begiven at
the beginning of the second period. In the firstperiod, hedecides the amount
of time to be devoted to human capital accumulation (rn1), own consumption (C1),
and inter vivos transfers CT). The costs involved in human investment consist of5.
foregone earnings (w1m1) and direct costs. Since thelatteraccounts for only a
smi1lportion of total costs, it is assumed that foregone earnings are theOnly
costs of accumulating human capital. The stock of non—human capital at the end
of the first period is then,
(1) A1 ={i+(1_t2)r}A0±(l_t1)w1(1_m1)C1 -(l+t3)T
where r:interest rate
t1: wage income tax rate
t2: interest income tax rate
t3: tax rate on inter vivos gifts.
Interest is assumed to accrue at the beginning of each period. It is also assumed•
that A1 could be negative though not without limit. The borrowing limit can be a
function of many factora. The most important of all must be his present earning
ability. Therefore the capital market constraint is expressed as -
A1—(l-t1)qw1
where q is a certain positive number.
His wage rate in the second period is given by
=
w1g(m1)
where g(m1) is strictly concave human capital production function. He is assumed not
to do ny human investment in the second period, while spending2 of his time as
leisure. His stock of non-human wealth at the end of his life is given by,
()
A2
={l(l-t2)r}(A1÷I)(l-t1)w1 g(m1) (l_2)_ C2
which is assumed to be non-negative6.
Onething that deserves our attention is that T and (l-t)A2 of the current
generation coincide with A0 and I of the next generation respectively where t
denotes the tax rate on bequests-at-death.
Theobjective funotion which the agent tries to maximize consists of two
parts: own utility and utility arising from the satisfaction of bequest motives.
Therefore, it is weitten as
(5) u(c1, ÷ B{T,(l—t1)A2}
where argumentsare as defined inthe previous section. The own utility part of
the objective function, U(C1, C2, 22),is assumed to be monotone, strictly concave
in C1, C2, and 2' and twice differentiable. I also assume that this function is
additively separable. This is a somewhat restrictive assumption, but concrete
results cannot be derived without additive separability. The relationship
between the two arguments in the B function is important. I assume that the true
rela-tionship lies somewhere between two polar cases: additive separability and
perfect substitutability. In addition, I assume the B function is strictly concave.
We can observe the effects of the introduction of the capital market
imperfection by comparing two systems of first-order conditions: one where the
capital market constraint is not binding and the other with tho constraint binding.
Assuming for simplicity that all the endogenous variables have interior solutions)
the following set of conditions will lead to an intertemporal optimum in case the






(7) (l±t)(l-tL) {l ÷ (l-t )r}
B2
27.
The interpretation of these conditions are straightforward.The condition which
must hesatisfied for optimal human investment is givenby,
(8) g'(m1)(l-i2)1 e (l-t2)r
The left—hand side of this equation denotes theresulting increase in wage
earnings in the -sect ad period when an extra dollar is invested inthe accumulation
of human capital, while the right-hand side denotesits opportunity cost. What
this equation requires is simply that the costs andbenefitsof humaninvestment
should be equal at themargin.
Incontrast, when the capital market constraint is strictly binding, inter-




wherep andA denote the shadow price of theborowing constraint and the marginal
utility of terminal non-human wealth(A2) respectively, which are both strictly
positive. Clearly, {i(l-t2)r+isbigger than {i +(1-t2)r}.In the
presence of the strictly binding capital market constraint, theeffective rate
of interest the agent faces isgreater than the market rate of interest because
the former includes the shadow price of theborrowing constraint (n).Thecapital
market constraint acts as a distortionaryfactor, preventing him from allocating
fr
resourcesas well as he could underperfect capital markets. The optimal human
inYestment condition is now changed to,
g'(rn1)(l-2) =1+(1—t)r
+8.
Hemakes human investment up to the point where its marginal return is equal to
the effective, rate of interest. Hence human investment will fall short of the
unconstrained optimal level. i.e.,wherethe marginal return isequalto market
opportunity cost.There is possibly alink between thus distorted human investment
and the distribution of income. Since each individual is bound by the borrowing
constraint to a different degree, the distribution of earnings in the presence
of capital market imperfection must be different from what would have been in the
absence of such imperfection. The existence of imperfections in capital markets
could provide an important clue in understanding the causes of existing inequalities.
The comparative static exercises in the next subsection will tell us what kind of
distributional changes we can expect from eliminating such imperfection.
ComparativeStatics
Tofocus on the effects the capital market constraint, I limit attention to
the case where all of the six endogenous variables have interior solutions. The
comparative static results for non—binding and strictly binding capital market
constraint cases are summarized in Tables 1 and2.Of all the comparative static
results, the ones of greatest interest are those involving the change in q, the
proportionOf potentialwage earnings which determines the borrowing limit of the
agent,for it is these results that suggest what kinds of distributional changes
we can expect from easing thecapitalmarket constraint. Though not adding
directlyto the stream of income, an increase in q allowsthe agent to choose from
amongafr wider range of alternatives. Our primary interest lies in its impact on
the behavior of human investment. The finding is,
() :'> ofOrpeople for whom the con'staint is 'bindi.
What this result means is clear: people are willing to investmore in human
capitalif they are able to borrow more, for there are unexploited opportunities9.
involvedin human investment. Recall that an agent invests in human capital up to
the point where the marginal increase in next periods income is equal to the
opportunity cost of funds and that this opportunity cost is higher than the going
market rate of interest when the capital market constraint is binding:
(8') g'(m1)(l-2)1 +(l-t)r+
Anincrease in qdrives downtheshadow price of the capital market contraint(n),
thuslowering the value of the right--hand side of the equation. Unless an increase
absorbs all the decrease in the right-hand side, the agent will match this
decrease by increasing human investment. The comparative static result we just
obtained tells us thatdoes not in fact rise this much.
An increase in the borrowing limit (q) has the potential of enhancing the
economic well—being of consumers. The theorem of second best tells us that economic
well-being improves if all distortions are uniformly decreased. There is only one
source of distrotion in this model --theexistence of the capital market constraint
which causes a divergence between the effective rate and the market rate of
in-terest (by the amount of ).Arise in q narrows the divergence by lowering p.
This is clearly beneficial, according to the theorem of second best.
Anincrease in q may also contribute to an equalization of the distribution of
income or wealth. it is quite plausible that such a change is relatively more
beneficial to the poorthan to the rich. We have seen that those who have been
constrained by the borrowing limit invariably respond to a rise in q by increasing
their human investments (m1). Consequently their wage income will increase. This
will benefit the rich as well as the poor, since a rich person is as likely as a
poor one is to be constrained by the borrowing limit. However, the increase in wage
income by an equal arriount would mean more to a poor person, since it is a larger
-proportionof his income. The endowments of non-human capital would be the more
importantin determining the individual's economic condition, the more the capital10.
market constraint is binding. It is well known that the distribution of non-human
capital is much more uneven than that of capital. As the relative importasce of
wage .inoome among total income increases as a result of the rise in q, we can
expect that the distribution of income becomes more equal. Whether there will be
an actual equalization of the distribution of income, or how much equalization will
be realized if there is any is, of course, ultimately an ernpiri.ca]. matter. The
simulation exercises in following sections will shed some light on this point.
Uncertain Returns from Human Investment
Until now, it has been assumed that the a;ent has perfect foresight. Itcan
be shown, however, that our most important result in the previoussubsection,
din
(9) >0, dq
still holds true even in the setting of uncertainty. Among severalsources of
uncertainty in the context of the present model, I limit my at-tention to the case
where the returns from human investments are uncertain.
The wage rate for the second period now depends on the timespent for human
investment (m1) and on the future state of the world (0).
(10) w9w1 g(m1,0)
where 0 is a random variable with a knon distribution. As in thecertainty case,
I assume thatg1 >0and g11 <0.The derivative with respect to 0 could have
eitherign; for concreteness, I assumeg2 >0.
The agent is assumed to know only the distribution of 0 at thebeginning of
his life. His lifetime allocation plan should be basedon this distribution. Once
he knows the actual wage rate in the market, hemay find it desirable to modify the
plan. Unlike the case of perfect foresight, therefore, his optimizationprocess
will consist of twostages. (See Appendix 2).
I11.
WiLemost of the comparative static results under uncertainty are
ambiguous, the response of human investment to an increase in the borrowing
limit (q) is unambiguously positive under plausible assumptions as shown in
Appendix 2. It is thus proved that constrained individuals are willingto
invest more in human capital if they are able to borrow more even though
its future returns are uncertain. This finding can be used in addressing
one of the important questions in the theory o.f human investment. There are several
alternative explanations as to the observed gap between the marginal returns to
human and non-human investments. Lazear (1977) attributes this tendency to the fact
thatthe marginal utility of education is negative. According to Levhari and Weiss
(1971k), human investment may stop shortof the level whereits expected marginal
returnis equal to the marginal return onnon-human capital, if the characteristics
ofthe random variable satisfy certain conditions. What I have been trying to show
is that a substantial part of such a tendency may be attributed to the imperfection
dm1 in canital markets. That —ispositive even under the assumotion of uncertain
dq
returns from human investment strongly suggests that uncertainty alone cannot
explain the whole thing. Lazears assertion that the negative marginal utility
of education is a key to the observed cleavage is hardly convincing. One commoly
observed fact is that those who areveryrich are likely to receive more education
than the average person. Since they do not depend on wage earnings so much as the
average persona they have no reason to receive more education if it gives them
disutility. The implication is that they might derive positive utility from
education. However, I can show that is still positive even ifhuman
investment (m1) enters the utility functionas adisutility as Lazear's work
suggests.12.
II. Basic Setup of the Simulation Model
ObjectiveFunction
Tlieobjective function is assumedto take the form ofan iso-elastic function:
£ly




+ [T + {(1t)flA2}CT
The utility-of-bequest part takes a slightly different form from the own utility
part because of the special relationship between T and A2. If the two arguments of
the B function areperfectly substitutable, then C should beequal to one, If, on
theother hand, they are additively separable, thenshould be equal to zero. The
standard case assumes that the relationship is an intermediate one. Later on, the
simulation results for the standard case will be compared with those for the two
polar cases.
Creating a Sample of Indiriduals
The simulation model starts with a sample of 200 individuals with given
distributions of initial wage rates (w1), receipts of inter vivos transfers (A0)
and inheritances (I) and a set of eight taste parameters, ,p,,T,, C,U, and
n.
A. The Distribution of Initial Wage Rates (w1)
Thecreation of •the distribution of w1 was performed onthebasis of actual.
micro-datafrom the Current Population Reports and Ohio State University's National
Longitudinal Survey (NLS). TheConsumerIncome of the Current Population Reports
has a break-down of average full-time wageearningsby age and the level of
education.This can be used for computing the discounted sum of wage earnings
during the second period for each education level, which in turn will be converted3-3.
tothe relevant wage rates by assuming that the average individual works only two-
thiidk; of total time avaiiabie, As a result, theaveragewage rate of the lowest
education group turns out to be 297. 6 thousand dollars. This group of people can
beidentifiedwith those who do not invest at all or only a very small amountin
humancapital formation Therefore, the average initial wage rates which is
equal, byassumption,to the average second-period wagerateof those who do
not invest human capital at all, should he very close to this figure. I
assumeit to be 280 thousand dollars.
The next step is to choose the adequatedispersionof the variable. The mean
hourly wage rate of 10,128 respondents of NLS (full-time male workers of ages
between 16 and 24) is $2.71, while the standard deviation is $1.11. Accordingly,
the standard deviation of wage rates is set to 114.7 thousand dollars. The
observation of the frequency distribution of young workers strongly suggests that
a log-normal distribution, not a normal distribution, is a proper representation
of the actual distribution. A sample of 200 initial wage rates is drawnfroma
log-normaldistribution withthe mean of 5.5572 and the standard deviation of
Q•3939/ Thehighest wage rate in the sample is 711.4 thousand dollars fo.r one
period while the lowest is 93.0 thousand dollars. The Cmi ratio for w1 turns out
U./ tobe 0.211.—
B. The Distribution of Intergenerational Wealth Transfers (A0 and I)
Of the two kinds of intergenerationaltransfers, some pieces of information
haveben gathered about bequests or inheritances received. However, nothing
significant is known about inter vivosgifts.Therefore, the distribution of the
theoretical variable A0 in this study must be created completely out of guesswork.
Since no updated and improved data on inheritances is known to me, I use the same
data set as Blinder's (1974), that is, those collected by the Survey Research CenteriLL
forcreating the distribution of inheritances(T).rfheonly significant
modification is blowing up the magnitudes of inheritances to adjust for the change
inpurchasingpower.' The distribution of inheritances is created by taking an
uppertail of a normal distribution with the mean of -20967.7 and the standard
deviation of 40322.6; this makes the relative frequencies be 30.1% for those with
positive inheritances and 3.9% for those with $50,000 or morerespectively.
The distribution of inter vivos gifts is created in a similar way. An upper
rail of a normal distribution with the mean of p4902.0 and thestandard deviation of
19607.8is taken so that the relative frequencies by 59.9% for those with positive
inter vivosgiftsand 10.0% for those with $30,000 or more respectively; The
correlation coefficient between A0 and I is expected to be very high. This is
set to 0.95 arbitrarily.
However, one further modification should be made to the products of the
random number generator. The highest inheritance produced is merely $108,610, far
from the magnitudewhicb wenormallyexpect to be the inheritance of a millionaire.
To make the created sample look more realistic, I multiply the seven highest
inheritances by numers from 2 to 9. And inter vivos gifts matched with them are
also multiplied by the same numbers respectively. The Gini coefficients of the
variables A0 and I turn out to be 0.805 and 0.913 respectively. Intergenerational
wealth transfers are set to be distributed quite unequally. The correlation
coefficientbetween w0 and A0 as well as between w0 and Iis set to by 0.12 using
the estimate of Blinder (1976).15
The Distribution of Taste Parameters
Ofeighttaste parameters which could conceivably vary across individuals,
I allow only four variablesto varykeeping the rdst four invariant for the whole
samule population. The criterion of such a division is not the importance of
variables, but sheer convenience. The four variables which willbeheld invariant
across individuals are:
(i)a, thespeed at which the marginal utility of consumption declines
as consumption increases, is set to 1.5.
(ii) y, the speed at which the marginal utility of leisure declines as
consumption of leisure increases, is also set to 1.5.
(iii) c and ,which,as a group, determine the relationship between the
twoarguments intheB function and the speed at whichthe marginal
utility of intergenerationalwealth transfers declines as their
quantitiesincrease are set to 0.7 and 0.9 respectively.
The choice of 1.5 for aisconsistent with most of other studies on the suhject.
The parameter y is set equal to a for the standard case since there is no conclusive
evidence about theincome elasticity of leisureconsumption. But a higher and
a lower value of -y will also be tried to see the impact of different income
elasticities of leisure consumption on the distribution of income. The choice of
the values for Eandis made to satisfy the following two requirements. First,
the income elasticity of intergenerational wealth transfers should be higher than
that of consumption or leisure choice. Second, the average ratio of inter vivos
gifts to bequests-at—death individuals choose should lie in some reasonable region.
After numerous iteration, it was found out that the choice of 0.7 for£and0.9
forsatisfies the above requirements fairly well.
All the parameters which are allowed tovary across individuals are assumed
to have normal distributions
(1) The mean value of p, theparameter which represents the subjectiverate of timediscounting, ischosento be 0.33,correspondingto an
annualsubjective discount rate of 1.0%. This in turn will lead to
the mean value of 0.75 for —.Thestandard deviation for —is l+p 1-i-p
arbitrarilyset to 0.2 to allow sizable dispersion in time preferences.
(2)The mean valueof i,theparameterwhich represents the subject's
preferenceof leisure in relation to other consumption goods, is
set equal to 0.015 so that the average person's choice of leisure
be.0.7ofhis available time. The standard deviation of Tis set
to be one-third of the mean.
(3) The choice of the mean value of a,theparameter representing the
relative preference for intergenerationalwealth transfers, is
madeto let the average amount of intergenerational wealth transfers
to the next generation net of tax be approximately equal to the
average amount individuals receivefrom the previous generation.
After some iterations, the value of 0.001is chosen. The standard
deviation of ais arbitrarily set to 0.0003.
(4)The last taste parameter to be determinedisr. This pararnter
reflectsan individual's subjective preference between the two
channels of intergenerational wealth transfers; inter vivos gifts
and bequests-at-death. Since the bequest--at-death is made one
period after theinter vivosgift, the rate of interest or the
subjective rate of time discount can be used as a guide to choose
the mean value of fl. People might feel that inter vivos gifts are
relatively more valuableto their descendants in theworld of
imperfectcapital markets. Hence the meanvalue of risset to 0.4,
which is slightly smaller than .Thestandard deviation of
is again arbitrarily set to 0.1.
A question ay arise as to the possible correlation between taste paramters
1617.
among themselves or between taste parameters, wage rates, or inherited wealth. Since
Blinder (1974) has dealt with the problem already, I will stickto the case where
17/ no correlation exists between thorn.—
It has been assumed that the human capital production function hestrictly
concave. In actuality, however, the existing data suggest that the function is
18/ rather linear or even convcx.— As acompromise, a function with very small





Thisfunction is chosen on the basis of NLS data mentioned earlier.
Even though the present model is basically one of imperfectcapital markets,
a single rate of interest is assumedfor borrowing and lending.This is also used
for discounting future IflCOJSCstreams. Most of the estimatesof the long-term
realrate of interest range from 3% to 8% per annum. But I feel theyare rather
on the higher side. A rate of 3% per annum will be used in thisstudy. Hence
therate of interest for oneperiod (30 years compounded annually) isassumed to
be 1'43%.
Proportionalrates areassumed for various taxes here for simplicity. Since
thereis no conclusive evidence on the incidence of tax burdensunder the present
U.S. tax system, the proportional rate of thepersonal income tax calculated from
thedata in the 1979edItion of Statistics of Incomewillbe used as the rates of
the wag income tax (t1) andthe interest income tax (t2). The ratio of personal
income tax receipts to income subject to tax was 0.21on 1976 returns.
The proportional rate of tax on the bequest-at-death(14) is calculated from
the data of estate tax returns as reported in the 1979 editionof Statistics of
Income, which is found out to be 12%. The rate of tax on intervivosgifts (t3),
however, cannot be, calculated in such amanner, since there is no exact real world
counterpart of such a tax. Due to many deductible itemsas well as loopholesinvolvll in such kinds of transfers, Lhe effective rate of tax issupposedly very
low.I assunie it to he 5%, whichismuch lower than t.
III. I)iStributi000i Impact of Capital MarketImperfection
In this section, theresultspf simulation exercises astothedistributional
impacts of capllal market imperfection under various assumptions will bepre.s ented.
The alternative assumption which wil.l replace the standard onesaresummarized
inthe following.
(i) The shape of the uitlity of bequest (B) function.
The cases of perfect substitutability and additive separability
will be considered.
(ii) Different income elasticities of leisure consumption.
The standard case assumes that the value ofis equal to -that
of a.
The cases with a higher and a lower elasticity of marginal utility
of leisure will be considered.
(iii) Different distributions of inter vivos gifts
(A0).
As pointed out earlier, our information on this kind of transfer
is almost non-existent. The standard case assumes that 6C1i of
people receive positive inter vivos gifts while l0 of people receive
more than 30 thousand dollars. The impact of more or less skewed
initialdistributions of A0will be studied.
The StidardCase
Mystartingpoint is the case where each individual is able to borrow one-
tent1of his current wage rate (ie,q=01), the utility- if-bcqucst function
takes the intermediate form, and all the paraseters have the value stated in the
previous sections. The distribution of lifetime potential income (LPI) resulting
from the sirnulation is shom in Table 3. While the level of utility itself
should be the criterion by wacb one's economc 0311.-being ineasure'
18.19.
inhcrentdifficulties involved in cardinelizat ion of utility makes it
inevitable to substitute it with aeroxy variable in studying distributive
prch1ms. Hence, lifetime potential incone which includes the irnnutedvalue
of ccs.umed leisure is adopted as ameasure of one s economic well-being in
this study. More concretely, the lifetime potentialincome is defined as,
20/ (l4LpIC1 +T + {c9w912+(l_14)A2}.
Thefirst thing to note is that the lifetime income isdefinedby net
consumption.The other point is that one's own wage rate is used in
calculating inputed value of leisure consumption. As shown in Table 3,
the Gini ratio for LPI turns out to be 0.2543. And theaverage person
spends 0.285 of his total time available (8.55 years) during the first
period in human capital accumulation.
When every individual is allowed to borrow freely against hisfutureincome,
it is observed that theaveragehuman investment drastically increases from0.285
to0.539. As the result, a majority of people now have higherwage rates for the
second period. Thisincreasein the relative importance of wage earnings reduces
the Cmi ratio from 0.2543 to 0.2452. The reduction in the Cmiratio by 3.6%
doesnot look very great, but the improvement in the distibution of lifetime
incomes, not short-run monetary incomes, of this magnitude ishardly insignificant.
TheGini ratio for the second period income (SPI)aloneis observed to decrease by
as much as 8.5% (from 0.2254 to 0.2O62). Note that this secondperiod income is
theclosest counterpart of the annual monetary income which is the niostwidely used
measure of economic well-being. In addition to contributing to theequalization of
income distribution, the increase in human investmentcan possibly raise the
absolutelevel of national income. The simulation results show that thegain in
national income, due to the increase in human investmentamounts to 15,098 thousand
22/ dollars, or 20.Ls of total income, when evaluated at the currentwage rates.—
As is well known, the comparison of two Cmi ratios ismeaningful only if the
twoLorenzcurves lying behind them do not intersect each other.'Fortunately,20.
thetwo Lorenz curves, one with the capital market constraint and the other without
it, do not intersect. (See Table t)
AlternativeAssumptions on the Shape of theB Function
The simulation results show that changes in the assumption about the shape of
the B function does not change the picturemuch. It is expected that the
equalization due to the elimination of capital market imperfections
will he less if the substitutability between the two arguments of
the B function is greater. This is because easier substitution of one type of
intergenerational transfer with the other type of tarnsfer could lessen the degree
to which the capital market constraint binds the subject. This expectation is
supported by simulation results only in part. That is, while the simulation results
in thecase of perfect substitutability turn out to be consistent with this
expectation,those in case of additive separability show the opposite tendency.
The degree ofimprovement in thedistribution of lifetime potential incorle (LPI)
whenthe capital market constraintiseliminated falls from 3.6% ofthe standard
caseto 3.2% if the two arguments of the B function are perfectly substitutable.
Contrary to the expectation, theadditiveseparable case also leads to a slight
fallin the degree of improvement, though the change is very small. It turns out
that the distribution of LPI improves by 3.5% when the B function is additively
separable, as compared to 3.6% in the standard case (see Table 5).
0uconclusion from the above discussion might be that the change in the
assumption about the shape of the B function does not modify the results of the
standard case very much. Iote, however, such a conclusion should be confined to the
case of single-generation experiment. When itcomes to theexperiment with multi-
generation,wemightreach a quite different conclusi.on' In view of the high
sensitivity of individuals behavior concerning bequest motives to differing21.
assuinstions on the relations between two kinds of interenepatonalwealth transfers
arid the critical roles that such intergenerational wealthtransfers play in
individuals Vlifetimeallocaulon processes, it is very plausible that the dis-
tributive pictures after several generations would bequite. different from each
other dapending upon the specific assumption chosen.
Different_Elasticities of tIie Marginal_Utility of Leisure
The standard case assumes that the elasticity of themarginal utility of
leisure,y, is equal to 1.5. However,the estimates of the income elasticity of
laborsupply from which a value for the parametercan be inferred are very much
varied.Therefore itwill be useful to try different values fory and see how
the results differ from those of the standardcase.
It is shown in the Appendix how to transforman estimate of •he income
elasticity of labor supply into a value for the parametery. According to the
formula,avalue of 1.5 foris consistent with the income elasticity of labor
supplyhaving a value of Since most of the estimatesof income elasticity
formale workers are concentrated intheregion 0.00 to -0.16, bothhigherand
lowervalues for yshould be tried. The twovalueschosen are 0.5 and 2.5.When
y is set equal to 0.5 rather than 1.5, the elasticity of themarginal utility is
lower, so that people spend a larger portion of increased unearnedincome on leisure
thanthey would do in the standard case. The opposite will holdtrue when'is
set equal to 2.5.
I is expected thatthelower the value for the parameter y is, thegreater the
impact of the elimination of capital market imperfection.When y has a low value,
i.e.,leisure has more of the characteristic ofa luxurygood, there will bea
largevariance in leisure consumptionamong individuals. Sincethe rich are expected
to consume large amounts of leisure,they have little incentive to increase human
investment even though they are allowed to borrowwithout limit. On the other hand,22.
thepoor will invest heavily in the formation of human capital stock which is to
be used intensively, if they are able to borrow without limit against future
earnings. This asymmetry, which gets larger as the value for ybecomeslower, may
leadto the difference stated above.
As can be seen in Table 5, the simulation results support this expectation.
When the y is set cqial to 0.5, thedegreeof reduction in the Cmi ratio for LPI
when borrowing constraint is eliminated amounts to 5.0%, which is significantly
larger than 3.6% in the standard case. When y is set equal to 2.5, it falls to
2.9%. Note also that the distributions of SPI vary in consistence with our
expectation. One interesting observation is that the increase in human investment
gets greater as the value for y becomes lower.
Different Distributions of inter vivos Gifts
The standard case assumes that 60% of individuals in the sample population
receive positive inter vivos gifts (A0) from their parents while 10% of people
receive 30 thousand dollars or more of such gifts. As mentioned before, these
figures come completely out of guesswork. If the initial distribution of A0 were
more skewed, then probably more people would he constrained by the borrowing limit,
and so the impact of the elimination of capital market imperfection would be
greater. The simulation results confirm this prediction. Ifmore skewed
distribution of A0 (45% above zero and 6% 30 thousand dollars or more) is taken,
the Cmi ratio of the distribution of LPI falls by 3.8% when the borrowing limit
is eli.inated as compared to 3.6% of the standard case. A less skewed
distribution of A0 (75% above zero and 15% 30 thousand dollars or more) is observed
27/ to result in less reduction in the Cmi ratio than in the standard case.-— The
other simulation results are summarized in Table 5. Note that the elimination of
capital market imperfection could still be effective in improving income distribution23.
evenunder a rather extreme assumption that three quarters of people
receive positive inter vivos gifts.
TV. Conclusions and Policy Implicat ions
The analyses in previous sections suggest that at least a part of the
existing inequality in income can be attributable to the imperfection in
capital markets. This in turn suggests that the income distribution will
become more equal if such imperfections are eliminated. The government
can achieve a significant gain in its effort to equalize income distribution
either by furnishing more generous loans for human investmentpurposes
directly or encouraging the private sector to take more liberal lending
policiestoward this kind of loan requests.
Easing the grip of the capital market constraint, as a redistr.ibutive
policyrueasure, seems to have several advantages over other redistributive
measures, existing or proposed. The first one is that such a measure could
achieveredistribution without hurting anyone in societ in absolute terms.
Those who have been constrained by the borrowing limit would he unambiguously
better off, while those whohavenot been wouldbeat least as well off as
28/
beforeT The nature of redistribution is not giving themoney taken from
the rich to the poor,but making the poor relatively better off by allowing
them to exploit unused opportunities of human investment. Therefore, the
societycan enjoy a bigger economic pie as well as more equal shares.
The second advantage is that one need not bother to sort out only those
fr
whodeserve public help as other redistributive ñieasures require to do, since
everyone, who is willing to exploit the unused opportunities and is ready to
repayin the next period is free to borrow under this system. And finally,
this measure would lead to greater intergenerational mobilityby providing
children from poor families with the means to exploit the opportunities of
human investment to their fullest. This measure would let society224.
approach the principle of equal opportunity a little moreclosely.
Hereone question might arise. If there actually exists such unexploited
opportunities in theeconomy,then why has the private sector failed to exploit
them? Or, in other words, what puts the government in a better position to do the
job? Supposing that the private sector acts rationally, if such opportunities
actually existed, itwould make the best use of them, even without the government
intervention. Probably, one of the most important reasons for the existence of
the capital market imperfection is moral hazard. Bankers are reluctant to lend
money against future earnings, since the default risks involved in such lending
practices are too high for them. The difficulties bankers have in enforcing the
repayment of unsecured loans are related to high costs of legal actions, both in
terms of time and money, in case they are necessary. Loans of such a kind as
proposed in this study will give bankers more headaches than profits, since the
number of accounts they have to take care of is astronomical while the size of, and
therefore the profit from, each account is relatively small.
Now the question is narrowed to this: Is the welfare gain from government
intervention large enough to offset the efficiency loss which might accompany such
government intervention? Even though a definite answer cannot be given on a priori
grounds, there seems to be good reasons to think that the answer is in the positive.
As pointed out in previous sections, the welfare gains cxpected from the elinilnation
of such imperfection are two-fold. First, the elimination of the distortioriary
factor in one's intertemporal optimization process will lead to an efficiency gain.
Second the distribution of income will be favorably affectedby such a change.
It is very implausible that the possible efficiency loss due to the public
assumption of a role which could have been best served by the private sector
dominates the sum of the two. Moreover, such an efficiency loss can be minimized
if the government does not directly intervene in financial markets but just25.
provides appropriate environment for improved functioning of the markets. The
government's guarantee for such loans might be enough to persuade private hankers
into utilizing such unexploited opportunities.
fr26.
APPENDIX1. Conversion of the Income Elasticity of Labor Supply into the
Elasticity of Marginal Utility of Leisure.
Suppose that the observed value of the income elasticity of labor supply is
consistentwith thesolution of the following instantaneous utility maximization
problem.
(A.l) Maxu(c)+V(l)




In the context of the present model, C includes intergonerational wealth transfers
as well as ordinary consumption. The first order condition for an optimum is,
(A.2) Vt wUt 0
Totally differentiating Eq. (A.2), we have
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The. income elasticity of labor supply ()isgiven by,
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Taking an average value of £ to be 0.3 and assuming that the ratioof unearned
income to the wage rate (!)tobe 0.1, we can simplify Eq. (A.6),
0.3 0.1
(A.8') -y=— —- ct(7—+1)
Remembring that we setequal to 1.5, wecanfuther simp1i the formula,
(A.8u) I =- 0.O80 -0.5625
27.28.
APPENDIX 2: Optimization Process WhentheReturns from Human Investment
Are Uncertain.
Whenthe returns from human investment are uncertain,an individual' s
lifetimeoptimization process consists of two stages. First, he decides
how he shall determine the optimal C2, 22 andA2once all exogenous variables,
first-periodvariables, and the random variable, 0,are realized. This amounts
to expressing the optimal 2. 2 and A2 as functions of those variables. This
taskcan be done by maximizing
+B(T,A2)
withrespect to C2, 2 and A2 subject to relevant constraints. The next
stage is to maximize the expected utility using the results obtained above.
Maximize
E[U{C1, C2(•), ÷ BIT, A2())]
C1,M1,T
againsubject to relevant constraints.
dm1 Thederivative which we aremost interested in, -a—-, canbe figured out













Wehave this very complicated expression for the response of human investment












where jD and IFdenotethe determinants of endogenous
the second stages of optimization process respectively.
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under plausible assurnptionsTSince every term in the
dm1
can establish that —a-—is unambiguously positive.
matrices for the first and
Both of them are positive
expression is positive, weTable 1
Summary of Comparative Static Results--Interior Solutions
cr Endogenous Variables andBinding Capital Market Constraints
dC1 dO2 dm1d l j dT dA2
dA0
-1- + — + -i- +
-f- + + - -i- +
dw1
+ i- ? ? + -I-
? ?- + ? ?
dt1 - - ? ? -
?
-H
dt2 ? -i- — ?
:::: : ::
Conditional on the assumption that {l-t-(l-t2)r}A0 ++ I 0.
30.1dt

















ini Ratio for LPI 0.2543 0.2462 —3.6%
ini Ratio for SF1 0.2254 0.2062 —8.5%
Average Human
Investment 0.285 0.539 +89.1%
2nd Period Total
llncome (In
housand Dollars) 74173 89271 i-20.4%
ITable
Distribution of Incomes WithandWithout the
Borrowing Constraint: Standard Case
.
PopulationGroup
Share in Total (%)








7.11 Third 10% 6.77 6.91
Fourth 10% 7.57 7.68 7.88 8.28
Fifth 10% 8.87 8.9+ 9.09
Sixth 10% 9.45 9.50
10.09
9.80— 10.01
Seventh 10% 10.07 10.64 10.68
Eighth 10% I 11.19 11.19 11.87
13.95
11.77
Ninth 10% 12.98 13.07 13.70
Highest 10% 23.07 22.31 19.33 18.17
(Top 2.5%) 14.94 14.28 6.23 5.71
(Top 1%) 5.17 4.82 2.80 2.51
33.Table 5
Impact of the Elimination of Borrowing Constraint
Under Various Alternative Assumptions
Assumptions













y =0.5 0.24820.2357—5.00.22720.2050 —9.80.2650.577ll7.7
y =2.5 0.25750.2501-2.90.23210.2127-8.30.2880.524+81.9
45% —6% 0.25440.2449-3.80.22620.2057 -9.10.2760.542+96.4
75% -15% 0.25120.2430-3.30.22300.2061 -7.60.2970.536
34.35.
FOOTNOTES
1Themirriage decision does riot enter this model. So when I uco the word
"individual" or "agent", I refer to a family unit.
2Almoctall of the life-cycle resource allocation modelsassumethat the bequest
at death is the only way of transferringnon-human wealth from generation to
generation.Only Ishikawa (197k) and Drazen (1978) deal with the model in which
morethan one method of wealth transfers areintroduced.
3Theimperfection in capital markets can take several forms whet) itactually occurs.
In this study, I limit my attention to only' one formofsuch imperfection --limit
toone's borrowing ability.
41n contrast, nothing hasbeenassuiiied as to howw1 is related to the characteristics
of the agent's parents. Though it is very probable that it is proportional to his
parent's stock of human or non-human wealth or some other characteristics, it is
assumed purely exogenous in this study.
5The sign of is.not posited here. It turns out thatitssi&ff does not
matter in the determination of the sign of the derivative _!.whichwe are
mostinterested in.
'6ThecondItion, in the context of the present model, is that g2 >0and g12.> 0.
7Oneperiodof an individual's economic life is assumed t? be of length of 30 years.
Therefope, assuming thathestarts his economic life when he is 10 years of age,
whatwe call the first period in this study means the time span till the, age of40,
and the second period is thereafter until the age of 70. An individual who is 10
years old maynotbe mature enough to planhis own economiclife. But thatageis36.
7(cont'd) selected to avoid the awkward case where an individualwith more human
investment has a higher wage earnings even duringthe first period, contrary to
what the theoretical model implies. This can happenif the first period of the
model is set to include a later stage of one'scalendar age because of the steep
wage urofile of high educationreceivers.
8Annual wage earnings are discounted by the rate of (r-g), where r and g denote
real
thetinterest rate and the growthrate of the economy respectively. The reason
why (r-g), instead of r, is used as the rateof discount is that cross-section
data are used here. If all of the wage rates grew bythe rate of g, discounting
by the rate of (r-g) would be an appropriateprocedure for cross-section data.A
value of 1.5% per annum is chosen for the rateof discount assuming that r and g
are 3% and 1.5% respectively.
Since economic age zero in this model corresponds tocalendar age 10, the average
stock of initial human capital is assumed to be 5 yearsof schooling equivaleflS.
'0Consider a positive variate X such that Y =logX is normally distributed with
mean p and variance2. The mean a and variance of the variate X are related
to p and a2 in the following way.
Ci)a=e
22
2 2ii-I-Ga (ii) e Ce—1)
Since c andare assumed to be 280 thousand and 11.7thousand respectively, the
mean of a log-normal distribution, p, is setto 5.5572 while the standard deviation
0,isset to 0.3939.
liCre with Blinder's (l97) ratio of 0.258.37.
12Fordiscussion of the drawbacks of the data, see Blinder (l97, pp. 9l—93).
13
Due to inflation, a dollar in 1960, when the survey was taken, is worth only
'8.8 in 1977.
These percentages are slightly higher than whattheoriginal survey data show.
I suspect there was a fairly substantial understatement of inheritances received
among respondents.
See, for example, Driffili. (1977).
'6Most of the estimates of the income elasticity of labor supply, from which the
incomeelasticity of leisure consumpt ion can be derived, lie in the region 0.000
and —0.160. See Killingswonth (1976). However, it does not seem that a consensus
is reached about the issue.
17This case corresponds to Blinder's (l97L1.) "Egalitarian Society't except for one
thinghisegalitariansociety assumes that the correlation between w0 andI
is zero while my case assumes it to be 0.12.
/
'8See, for examole, Mincer (l97L).
19The constant c is assumed to be distributed normally with the mean of 1,0 and
the standard deviation of 0.2 to introduce some randomness inthedetermination
of
w2.
20The lifetime potential income defined as such is greater than the sumof labor
earninisand capital income by th discounted sum of intergenerationaltransfers
received. Also note that the imputed value of the government expendituresis not
included in the definition. This omission would not pose a serious problemsince
the changes in tax rrvenues, and therefore the government expenditures, are notthat
great.38.
2IThe second period income (SPI) is defined by the sum of labor earnings, that is,
w1.g(]-Q2), and interest income. The simulation results show that those who
increase human investment following the elimination of the borrowing limit, mostly
the lowerand middleincome classes, significantly decreaseleisure consumption
whilethe rich do not change their leisure consumption. This might be
responsible for such adifference between thedegrees of improvement in the
distributionsof LPI and SPI. The other factor isthat, due to discounting, the
increase in the second period labor income due to increased human
investment increases the lifetime potential income by a much smaller amount.
22Note that this figure is aii overestimation of the true increase in national
income for the followingtworeasons. First •sucha general increase in human
investment reduces labor supply by younger workers. Hence the value of reduced
laborsupply during the first period should be subtracted from the above figure
to reach a true increase in national income for the whole population. Second,
due to general equilibrium effects, such an increase in the aggregate labor
supply, measured in efficiency unit, would depress the overall wage rates
23Atkinson (1970), points out that, even though the condition that the Lorenz
curves do not intersect holds, the Gini ratio still embodies some specifie- social
welfare function.
21See Pryor (1973) for simulation of income distribution in a multi—generation
setting.
25Notethat this conversion also depends on the chosen value for ,elasticity
of the marginal utility of consumption.
26
The Gini ratio for A in this case is 0.86'4-5 as opposed to 0.8051 of the
standard case.
27
The Cmi ratio for A in this case is 0.7197, the lowest of the three cases.









These conditions are assumed to hold everywhere, not necessarily in the
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